Abstract: Can poverty decline with little growth in real GDP? This paper examines the case of Jamaica, where the poverty headcount halved between 2003 and 2007 despite real per capita GDP growth of just 1.1 percent per year, by analyzing the factors contributing to the observed reduction in poverty using household and labor force surveys. It sets out by providing a sectoral, demographic, and spatial picture of the evolution of poverty and finds that poverty reduction has been broad based, benefitting both rural and urban areas. Nearly three quarters of the poverty reduction is attributed to growth in average household consumption, which outpaced GDP growth due to large remittance inflows, and one quarter to narrowing inequality. In turn, around half of the reduction of inequality is explained by narrowing returns to education and declining sectoral wage gaps.
Introduction
Can substantial poverty reduction occur with little growth in real GDP? The literature on the links between growth and poverty concludes that growth is fundamental for poverty reduction (see, for example, Lopez, 2004; Dollar and Kraay, 2002 ). Yet, in the case of Jamaica, poverty halved from 21.0 percent of the population in 2003 to 9.9 percent in 2007 while real per capita GDP grew by just 1.1 percent per year.
1 This yields an elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to a change in mean income of -16, much higher than the values of such elasticities usually observed in the data.
2 Moreover, the substantial fall in the poverty headcount was accompanied by a narrowing of inequality, with most of the reduction in poverty occurring in initially poorer areas outside of the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA).
What explains this episode of poverty reduction without growth? This paper uses household and labor force data to evaluate the distributional aspects of growth in Jamaica and identify some of the main determinants of distributional change. First, the paper develops a poverty profile for Jamaica and traces the evolution of poverty from 2003 through 2007. Second, the paper investigates the extent to which the fall in poverty was due to rising consumption in the absence of growth vs. pro-poor changes in income distribution. Next, the paper examines the determinants and drivers of distributional change during this period by focusing on labor market outcomes -such as returns to education, experience, and sectoral premiumsand linking these outcomes to household consumption.
The paper finds that the 2003-07 reduction in poverty was geographically and economically broad-based and driven both by growth in average consumption and a reduction in inequality, with the latter underpinned by a combination of narrowing returns to education and declining sectoral wage gaps. Consumption per capita, supported by a rapid increase in international remittance inflows, grew much more rapidly than real GDP and contributed about 75 percent to the overall poverty reduction observed between 2003 and 2007 , while the narrowing of inequality accounted for the rest. Households in the 2 nd and 3 rd deciles of the income distribution reaped the largest gains over the period.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses 1 However, poverty spiked to an estimated 17.6 percent of the population in 2010 (a third consecutive year of increases) due to the severe economic contraction following the global crisis. 2 This elasticity is calculated as the percent change in the poverty headcount for a one percent change in real GDP per capita. Ravallion and Chen (1997) estimate the average growth elasticity of poverty for a sample of developing countries to be around -3. Recent (late 1990s to mid-2000s) poverty reduction episodes in India, China, Vietnam, and Mexico have yielded elasticities of -0.2, -0.5, -1.0, and -6.8, respectively. However, it should also be noted that the poverty elasticity of growth is larger in absolute value when the initial headcount ratio and initial inequality are lower (see Bourguignon, 2003) .
Copyright c 2013 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 2 the determinants of poverty reduction between 2003 and 2007, Section 3 explains the observed inequality trends in terms of labor market dynamics and their links to household welfare, and Section 4 offers concluding remarks. Although labor market dynamics per se are not the main focus of the paper, participation and earnings in the labor market feature prominently throughout the paper because they represent the main determinants of household consumption, particularly for poor households who have little other assets.
Evolution of Poverty and Inequality: 2003-2007

Jamaican Poverty Dynamics in the Caribbean Context
Due to limited data availability, little has been written about the evolution of poverty and inequality in the Caribbean. Poverty is estimated to be above 40 percent of the population in countries such as Haiti, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic (after the crisis). Common interlinked features of poverty in the Caribbean include high crime, drug trafficking, and youth unemployment. Sizable informal economies, where workers lack protection and stability, are often cited as another source of vulnerability for incomes of the poor.
Compared to neighboring countries, Jamaica has had relative success in reducing poverty over time and is presently classified by the World Bank as a country with 'high human development'. Poverty in Jamaica fell from 30.5 percent of the population in 1989 to an all-time low of 9.9 percent in 2007 ( Figure 1 ). However, poverty has increased substantially since the onset of the global economic crisis, rising to 17.6 percent in 2010 due to three consecutive years of economic contraction and a spike in unemployment. Inequality, on the other hand, has remained relatively stable over the past two decades with the Gini coefficient varying between 0.38 and 0.40. Interestingly, poverty has been declining in Jamaica with little to no aggregate growth. Despite relative political stability and relatively high levels of investment (around 25 percent of GDP), real GDP per capita was about the same in 2007 as in the early 1970s and real GDP growth has been close to zero since 1992. This anemic growth has been pervasive across the economy, with financial services and telecommunication being the only sectors growing by more than 4 percent a year in the last two decades. Some studies (e.g., IADB, 2006) argue that the reported GDP underestimates the real level of economic activity by as much as 40 percent due to a large and growing informal sector. Informal employment in Jamaica is estimated to be much higher than in many of its Caribbean neighbors (e.g., Trinidad & Tobago at close to 15 percent) and much closer to levels typically found in the rest of Latin America (Figure 2 ). However, even if the reported growth numbers are an under-estimate, growth driven by the expansion of the informal sector is not usually perceived as pro-poor.
Looking for the explanations of this low growth performance, World Bank (2011) identified the main constraints to growth as high levels of crime, low levels of human capital, and a distortive tax regime. High crime has channeled investment into relatively isolated sectors such as mining, all inclusive hotels and Export Free Zones, reinforcing an enclave model of development and encouraging emigration. Low levels of human capital have hindered the uptake of new technologies by Jamaican firms. Tax distortions have given rise to a highly complex system of incentives given out on a discretionary basis, which penalizes innovation and entrepreneurship and fosters corruption. In addition, frequent occurrences of natural disasters and erosion of preferential trade access to the US and Europe have further dampened Jamaica's growth prospects.
How Broad-Based Was the Reduction in Poverty?
What are some of the main features of the "growth-less" reduction in poverty in Jamaica in 2003-07? Table 1 presents the evolution of poverty and inequality in Jamaica during this period, as calculated by the authors from the successive rounds of the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC). As mentioned in the introduction, poverty fell from 21 percent of the population in 2003 to 9.9 percent in 2007. Extreme poverty -defined as the percentage of the population who is not able to afford the minimum adequate diet, as determined by the Jamaica Ministry of Health (MOH) -also fell from 6.6 percent in 2003 to 2.9 percent in 2007.
5 Furthermore, See the data section of the Annex for additional details. 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Share in total employment order measures of poverty, such as the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap, declined substantially over the same period, indicating that the depth of poverty fell along with its incidence.
6
Poverty reduction was broad-based, benefitting most segments of the society. As shown in Table 1 , both urban and rural poverty fell substantially (although urban poverty declined at a faster rate), and households headed by males and females shared the benefits of poverty reduction almost equally. Poverty also declined significantly among households with the primary earner working in agriculture and, from a spatial perspective, declined in every parish with the possible exception of Westmoreland. 7 Broadening the focus to the entire income distribution, fortunes improved across the board between 2003 and 2007, but households in the lower deciles gained the most. This is shown graphically in Figure 3 , which plots the incidence of growth (percentage increase in real consumption per capita) for each percentile of the distribution between 2003 and 2007 (the growth incidence curve (GIC) of Ravallion and Chen, 2003) . 8 The horizontal line in the 1-3, 10-14, and 15-18 years (PIOJ/STATIN, 2008) . 6 For example, the decline in the poverty gap indicates that the average distance from the poverty line has halved, while the fall in the squared poverty gap suggests that the fortunes of the poorest of the poor have also improved substantially. 7 See Annex for a more detailed discussion of poverty by locality, gender, and sector of employment. 8 As is the case for all GICs not derived from panel data, the distribution of welfare gains is anonymous in the sense that households comprising the bottom decile of the distribution in 2003 may not be the same households forming the bottom decile in 2007. However, even under anonymity the GIC is a useful tool for summarizing distributional changes, and integrating under the GIC up to the poverty line provides a measure of pro-poorness http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/51 5 Growth in welfare per adult equivalent 2003-2007, percent figure represents the average change in per capita consumption; therefore the deciles 2-8 for which the GIC is above this line gained more than the average. Even though the poorest decile of the Jamaican population fared worse than the average, these households still recorded substantial nominal gains of 70-80 percent. Moreover, the second decile -which was still poor in 2003 -gained more than the average, which helped accelerate poverty reduction over the period.
Consistent with the initially poorer parts of the distribution gaining more than the average, inequality declined with the Gini coefficient falling from 9 In other words, inequality decreased (or at least did not increase) throughout the income range. 10 of growth (Ravallion and Chen, 2003) . 9 Because mean income has also grown over the same period, the generalized Lorenz curve (Shorrocks, 1983; Kakwani, 1984) 
Macroeconomic Drivers of Poverty Reduction
In the absence of broad-based economic growth, what factors could be responsible for a substantial decrease in poverty like the 2003-07 episode in Jamaica? A standard technique which has been utilized in the literature to analyze the contribution of various factors to a given reduction in poverty is a decomposition of the observed change in poverty into "growth" (change in the survey mean only, with no distributional change) and "inequality" (no change in survey income, distributional change only) components.
11
The results of the exercise are shown in Table 2 . The second row shows the poverty headcount that would have been observed in 2007 if growth in mean consumption between 2003 and 2007 were the only driver of poverty reduction. The fact that this simulated headcount of 12.4 percent is above the actual headcount of 9.9 percent indicates that a decrease in inequality, in addition to growth, was an important component of poverty reduction. Similarly, the third row of Table 2 shows the poverty headcount that would have been observed if the mean remained unchanged and only the distribution improved.
12 Thus, the results of the exercise show that neither the "growth" nor the "inequality" component by themselves would have been sufficient to generate the observed reduction in poverty.
Why do our results show that most of the reduction in poverty was due to the "growth" component, when hardly any growth in real GDP per capita took place? One answer is that the survey measures consumption rather 11 The table shows the results of a non-parametric decomposition, which has the advantages of simplicity and no need to assume a functional representation of the Lorenz curve. The disadvantages vis-à-vis a parametric decomposition (e.g., Datt and Ravallion, 1992 ) include lack of a clear identification of the residual component (interaction between growth and inequality changes). 12 The contributions of two components do not sum up to 100 percent due to the presence of an interaction term (because all decompositions are path-dependent). However, in this case the interaction term is quite small. There are several potential reasons for the large difference between the growth in GDP and consumption. World Bank (2004) has argued that GDP growth could be substantially underestimated, while World Bank (2007) highlights the role of remittances, inflation deceleration, and relative price shifts which favor the poor. In particular, international remittances grew very rapidly between 2003 and 2007, increasing from 17 to over 20 percent of household consumption (left panel of Figure 5 ) and becoming a leading source of foreign exchange for the country, second only to tourism. Although much of the growth in remittances accrued to the richer households, a large and growing number of households in the poorest quintile also report receiving remittances (right panel of Figure 5) .
A large literature exists on the links between remittances and poverty reduction (see, for example, Fajnzylber and López, 2008) . Remittances can help reduce poverty and inequality in recipient countries by contributing to higher investment and growth and reducing volatility in foreign exchange inflows as their stable and slightly countercyclical nature helps insure against external and macroeconomic shocks. At the micro level, they allow poor recipient households to increase their savings, spend more on consumer durables, and improve children's health and educational outcomes. At least some of these links, particularly on the micro level, are present in Jamaica as well. For example, according to the 2006 Survey of Living Conditions, households in Jamaica largely use remittances for daily expenses, followed by spending on education and health. This dependence on remittances for routine expenditure likely explains a part of the nearly 8 percentage point spike in poverty in the aftermath of the global crisis (2008-10), when remittance inflows contracted by close to 5 percent.
Another substantial part of the decline in poverty is explained by a slower rate of growth in the cost of the consumption basket of the poor relative to the average price basket. In the JSLC, the cost of the consumption basket of the poor is measured by three poverty lines -KMA, other urban, and rural -which reflect the differences in cost of living across these three localities. Between 2003 and 2007, all three poverty lines grew by 49 percent. Over the same period, according to Bank of Jamaica (BoJ) statistics, overall inflation was 57 percent while the prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages rose by 65 percent.
14 Because the poverty line grew slower than aggregate inflation, the consumption basket of the poor became cheaper in relative terms and therefore contributed to poverty reduction.
As shown in the left panel of Figure 6 , poverty in 2007 could have been 11.9 percent (instead of 9.9 percent) if the poverty line were indexed to the overall CPI, and as high as 13.4 percent if the poverty line were indexed to the food CPI. The right panel of Figure 6 illustrates the same point by plotting the income distributions of 2003 and 2007 along with the respective poverty lines, as well as a hypothetical poverty line of 2007 obtained by indexing the poverty line to the food CPI. Although the differences between the two poverty lines are not very large, the density (number of persons) of the distribution around the poverty line is substantial, which explains the sensitivity of the poverty headcount to changes in the poverty line.
An additional factor which has likely played a role in the reduction of inequality in Jamaica during 2003-07 and therefore contributed to poverty reduction is the implementation of a conditional cash transfer (CCT) Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH). The 2002 consolidation of several social protection programs, including food stamps, into a proxy-means tested CCT improved pro-poor targeting and extended rural coverage. For example, upon implementation over half of PATH beneficiaries were in the poorest quintile, compared to one-third under the food stamp program it replaced. Impact analysis of the PATH program has shown increases in educational attainments, reduced child labor, improved health outcomes, and reduced poverty (World Bank, 2007) . The program has been expanded substantially since the onset of the global crisis, with coverage increasing from about 8 percent of the population in 2005 to around 14 percent in 2011. Nonetheless, benefit levels remain relatively small (a minimum monthly payment of J$400 is about 1 percent of per capita GDP) and program leakages are sizeable (the two poorest quintiles represent about three-quarters of PATH beneficiaries).
Given the large literature on financial development and poverty and the relative dynamism of the financial services sector in Jamaica, it is tempting to draw some links between the two. Normally, improved access to a better functioning financial system can help relieve poverty by facilitating savings, the ability to borrow to smooth consumption and/or invest, and the ability to receive money from government cash transfers and/or remittances. Theory also points to financial market imperfections in shaping inequality and the intergenerational persistence of human capital accumulation (and hence opportunities), determining who can become entrepreneurs (based on initial wealth), and discrimination (in the sense of a constant group of individuals with access to credit). Levine (2008) stresses that financial development disproportionately benefits the poor by relaxing credit constraints for consumption, investment, or spending on education or health.
Limited research has been done on financial development in Jamaica. A recent growth diagnostic study did not rank credit constraints among the top impediments to growth in Jamaica (World Bank, 2011) . 15 However, looking at financial development indicators (Figure 7) , we find that Jamaica scores below average compared to neighbor countries in terms of financial depth (measured by domestic credit provision by the banking sector relative to GDP and number of commercial bank branches per capita) and credit attractiveness (i.e., lending interest rate). These suggest that access to finance is both scarce and expensive, which is likely to be even more binding for the poor. Moreover, another way in which the poor could be directly affected by financial underdevelopment is in terms of their ability to receive international remittances. In fact, costs of sending remittances to Jamaica exceed comparable costs in neighboring countries: it costs around US$14 to send US$200 from the USA to Jamaica, compared to US$12 to the Dominican Republic or US$10 to Central America. In summary, this section has pointed to a number of macroeconomic channels which could drive poverty reduction in the absence of GDP growth and has illustrated them using examples from the 2003-07 period in Jamaica. The first and most important of these channels is foreign inflows-supported expansion in consumption. Jamaica has experienced high rates of skilled emigration over a long period, and the growth in remittance inflows can be viewed as a dividend on Jamaica's export of human capital.
17 Another important channel has been a pro-poor shift in relative prices, with inflation at the poverty line lower than at the mean of the distribution. Finally, pro-poor policies adopted during the period -such as the consolidation of benefit programs -have also likely played an important role. 16 Based on 2011 third quarter data from the World Bank Remittance Prices Worldwide (http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org). 17 While the long-term sustainability of increasing dependence on remittances may be questioned, other countries have relied on such strategies at least as a transitional tool (e.g., Philippines, see Taylor, 1999) and potential long-run adverse effects could be minimized by channeling remittances into more productive uses.
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Determinants of Distributional Change
No discussion of poverty-inequality dynamics is complete without an analysis of labor market developments, since labor is usually the main source of income for the poor. There are a number of factors affecting labor market dynamics in Jamaica, including powerful labor unions, a complex fiscal incentive structure favoring capital-intensive projects, quality challenges in the education system, low access to job training, and high rates of skilled emigration. While all of these factors are important, a large literature on poverty-inequality decompositions has demonstrated that focusing on the characteristics measured by labor and household surveys can normally capture and explain a substantial part of the overall dynamics (see, for example, Bourguignon et al., 2004) .
This section carries out such an analysis by identifying the drivers of distributional change in Jamaica between 2003 and 2007. First, it examines the determinants of individual labor earnings and labor force participation and their evolution between 2003 and 2007. Second, it links these labor market variables to the determinants of household consumption. Finally, it links the observed distributional change -as summarized by the GIC of Figure 3 and the Lorenz curve of Figure 4 in the previous section -to the evolution of returns to education and sectoral wage premiums.
The analysis in this section relies primarily on individual-and householdlevel characteristics captured by the labor force and household surveys. Following the tradition in the literature, estimation is therefore carried out using Mincer-type (Mincer, 1974) equations which model wages as a function of human capital proxied by variables such as schooling and work experience. Despite criticisms of the model's ability to accurately estimate returns to schooling (see, for example, Heckman et al., 2005) , it remains prominent in applications to poverty and inequality analysis (e.g., Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva, 2003; Bourguignon et al., 2008) due to its simple analytical structure and the availability of required data in nearly every labor/household survey. Table 3 shows the results of estimating the determinants of (log) real labor earnings of Jamaican workers, indicating that although returns to education increased between 2003 and 2004, they fell every year thereafter.
Wages
18
Educational attainment is measured by dummy variables that indicate the highest equivalent educational certificate that could be attained with the 18 The real wage is calculated by deflating the nominal hourly wage from the LFS with the change in the poverty line (from the JSLC) relative to 2003, therefore allowing for comparison of results between years. The poverty line is just one choice of deflator, and the results are robust to using other deflators such as the CPI. We choose to use the poverty line to avoid combining data from multiple sources.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/51 13 Observations are weighted by sample weights and regression estimated with robust standard errors. Educational dummies correspond to the individual completing the requisite number of years for a specified certificate, rather than the actual attainment of the certificate.
observed years of schooling, but not necessarily the actual attainment of this certificate. 19 This gives the dummies the interpretation of the return of completing each level of schooling relative to receiving no schooling at all.
20
Within each year, the educational dummies show increasing returns to progressively higher levels of educational attainment. However, across years, the evolution of the coefficients points to declining returns to education in every year after 2004 (Figure 8 ). This means that, for example, in 2007, a person who has completed the requisite number of years for an A-cycle could expect to earn less, in real terms, than a similarly qualified person of the same gender working in the same sector and same locality in 2004.
The observed pattern in returns to education is robust to adding controls for the determinants of labor market participation. To the extent that individuals may only participate in the labor market if the wage offered exceeds their reservation wage, the observed distribution of wage determi- 19 For example, if an individual completed 10 years of schooling, one year in excess of the years normally taken to complete an O-level certificate, the O-level dummy for this individual would be 1 and all the other educational dummies 0. Note that this approach does not take into account variations in quality of the education achieved, or the fact that test scores of Jamaican students tend to be low and lag behind regional averages (World Bank, 2011). However, information available in the survey does not allow for the construction of a more discerning measure of human capital. 20 Because only the dependent variable is expressed in logs, the value of the dummy coefficient cannot be interpreted as a semi-elasticity. Instead, the relevant semi-elasticity should be calculated as e β − 1
Copyright c 2013 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved nants (such as education, experience, etc.) is a non-random sample of the underlying population. Therefore, the OLS coefficient estimates of Table 3 will be biased if the same characteristics that determine real wages also determine the likelihood of labor market participation. Moreover, to the extent that there exists a set of statistically significant determinants of labor market participation, failure to take this selection process into account will result in omitted variable bias (a violation of the assumption of zero conditional mean of the error term). Heckman's (1974) solution to this problem -known as the Heckit procedure -is to estimate a system of equations where the first stage (selection) is a probit determining the likelihood of labor market participation and the second stage (outcome) is the desired Mincer equation. The Heckit estimates of real wage dynamics are shown in Table 4 . In Table 4 , the first column for each year, ln(wage), shows the selectioncorrected estimates of the real wage determinants, while the second column, P(wage), shows the determinants of labor market participation, which include the full set of variables in the outcome equation as well as a set of identification variables which explain participation but not earnings.
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The tan(ρ) row of the table shows the results of hypothesis testing on, ρ the coefficient of correlation between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations. The statistically significant value of ρ in each year indicates that the selection bias is present and OLS estimates are likely to be biased. This can be observed, for example, by comparing the educational dummy coefficients in each year between Table 3 and Table 4 : the estimated coefficients are lower in the latter case because education is a significant determinant of labor market participation and more educated individuals are more likely to be employed and earn a wage. However, it also obvious from comparing the results of Table 3 and Table 4 that the declining trend of returns to education is confirmed regardless of whether controls for selection are added to the equation; 21 Although theoretically the exclusion restriction can be satisfied simply by the nonlinearity of the inverse Mill's ratio (IMR) in the outcome equation and therefore no additional identification variables are required, in practice the IMR tends to be quite linear across most of its range and the inclusion of identification variables improves the performance of the estimator. 22 Note that the Heckit model does not include the sector dummies which were present in the OLS estimates. This is because the sector of employment is not observed for the unemployed or those out of the labor force; since this variable cannot be included in the selection equation, it cannot be a part of the outcome equation. (Table 3) .
Other determinants of the real wage, such as experience and gender, do not exhibit an obvious trend between 2003 and 2007. The OLS estimates of Table 3 show concave returns to experience and a negative wage premium for female workers, both fairly standard results in the Mincer equation. The Heckit estimates of Table 4 , however, are very different: the female wage premium is insignificant for most years and the returns to education become convex. These results could be due to the exit of skilled and high-earning women from the labor force and the concave relationship between experience and the likelihood of labor market participation: higher-paid workers may be able to retire (exit) earlier than lower-paid workers, driving down the observed wage for older workers. These results may also be linked to the increase in reservation wages of Jamaicans due to increased remittance inflows (documented in Kim, 2007) , which could encourage older workers and women from families with migrants (who tend to be better-educated and higher-earning on average) to exit the labor force. However, and regardless of whether one goes with the simple estimates of Table 3 or the  Heckit estimates of Table 4 , unlike with education, there is no clear pattern in the evolution of returns to experience or gender.
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Contribution of Labor Market Indicators to the Reduction in Iinequality
To what extent have the observed wage dynamics affected the distribution of household consumption and have contributed to the observed decrease in inequality? Table 5 shows the estimated relationship between the log of real household consumption per adult equivalent and a set of explanatory variables pertaining to the primary earner, the household overall, and a set of locality dummies for the years 2003 to 2007. 23 Similar to the results obtained from the analysis of the earnings data, education and the sector of employment of the primary earner are strong determinants of household consumption. On the other hand, the primary earner's experience does not appear to significantly affect consumption controlling for the factors above. In each year, the returns to reaching a particular level of education become progressively higher the more advanced the equivalent certificate. Other coefficients, including sector of employment, household size, home ownership, and locality (rural/urban) effects are statistically significant and carry the expected signs.
Consistent with the evidence in the labor force data, the importance of education of the primary earner in explaining the variation in household consumption has been declining over time. In addition to the diminishing returns to tertiary education -discussed in the earlier paragraphs -part of the explanation may also lie in the rising role of remittances in household budgets and the consequent decline in the importance of the primary earner wages for household consumption (see the discussion in Section 2 and also World Bank, 2007). In addition, the differences by sector of employment of the primary earner have also narrowed somewhat.
This combination of the education and sectoral dynamics explains a significant portion of the observed decline in inequality between 2003 and 2007. Returning to the central question of this section -to what extent the observed labor market dynamics explain the decline in inequality - Table 6 contains the results of a simple empirical exercise to understand the determinants of fall in the Gini coefficient between 2003 and 2007. The first row of the table reports the same Gini coefficients as Table 1 for ease of reference. The second row of the table recalculates the Gini using only the households for which the information required to estimate the consumption regressions of Table 5 was available. In some cases, such as 2003 and 2005, the withinsample and overall Gini coefficients are nearly identical; in others, such as 2006 and 2007, the difference amounts to several Gini points. The third row of the table shows the Gini coefficient calculated on predicted, rather than observed, consumption. In other words, the distribution of household consumption underlying the Gini coefficient reported in this row was obtained by using, for each household, the predicted (or expected) value of household consumption as given by the household's endowments and the estimated returns to these endowments (coefficients in Table 5 ). Not surprisingly, using the "average" estimated coefficients yields predicted inequality that is substantially below the observed inequality. 31 * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Note: Dependent variable is log of household consumption per capita. For each year after 2003, observed consumption is deflated by the rate of annual growth in the poverty line. Observations are weighted by sample weights and regression estimated with robust standard errors. Educational dummies correspond to the individual completing the requisite number of years for a specified certificate, rather than the actual attainment of the certificate.
The last three rows of Table 6 Table 6 ). This suggests that the observed fall in returns to education contributed to as much as a two-Gini-point decline in inequality. 
Conclusions
Between 2003 and 2007, real GDP per capita in Jamaica grew by just one percentage point per year. Yet, poverty fell dramatically from 21 to 10 percent of the population during the same period. Moreover, the reduction in poverty was broad-based: the extreme poor benefitted at least as much as those living below the moderate poverty line, both urban and rural poverty fell substantially, and households headed by males and females shared the benefits of poverty reduction almost equally.
What explains this episode of poverty reduction with hardly any growth in GDP? This paper finds that the decline in poverty was driven by a combination of growth in mean consumption, pro-poor changes in relative prices, and a reduction in inequality. Mean consumption growth substantially outpaced the increases in GDP due in great part to large and growing inflows of international remittances, while the decline in inequality was underpinned by a narrowing in the education and sector wage premiums.
What lessons can be learned from this episode? First, the paper's results show that poverty reduction can certainly occur in an environment of little to no GDP growth, but such declines in poverty could be fragile. More than three quarters of the reduction in poverty in Jamaica was accounted for by the growth in average consumption which was largely supported by external inflows. The reliance on external inflows is likely to subject poverty to a substantial degree of volatility, as illustrated by a nearly 8 percentage points spike in poverty in 2008-10 as remittances fell and unemployment rose during the global economic crisis. A related point is that a remittance-based poverty reduction strategy may also not be sustainable in the long run as the exit of workers who send remittances starves the economy of the necessary human capital. Jamaica has one of the highest skilled emigration rates in the world (estimated at 85 percent by Docquier and Rapoport, 2004) , giving rise to substantial "brain-drain" which has severely limited productivity growth.
Second, the decline in inequality -while helping to reduce poverty in the short term -appears to have occurred in part due to a narrowing of the sectoral and educational wage premiums. This could signal an improvement in the functioning of the labor market, as inter-sectoral wage premiums are normally interpreted as indicative of labor market rigidities, while a deCopyright c 2013 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 20 cline in returns to higher education (relative to those with little or no formal education) could mean an increase in the supply of skilled workers. The latter is particularly relevant for Jamaica, which -due largely to very high "brain-drain" -has historically experienced skills shortages and has one of the highest rates of return to schooling (see Bils and Klenow, 2000; World Bank, 2011) . 24 On the other hand, to the extent that the decline in returns to progressively higher levels of schooling may have been caused by falling demand, this could have adverse long-term effects on productivity growth and human capital accumulation as lower returns to education raise the opportunity cost of staying in school and may affect the incentives to pursue advanced studies. Further empirical work on estimating supply and demand for skilled labor in Jamaica could shed more light on this issue and yield important policy lessons for other countries with high rates of skilled emigration.
Overall, this paper's analysis of the determinants of the reduction in poverty observed during 2003-07 in Jamaica shows that poverty can decline rapidly even when growth is essentially flat, but that such declines are likely to be fragile and unlikely to be sustainable over the long term. A sustained reduction in poverty, either in Jamaica or in most of its Caribbean neighbors, is unlikely to occur without an acceleration in growth. In turn, the extent to which any acceleration in growth is pro-poor will depend importantly on a number of factors discussed in this paper -shifts in relative prices and labor market developments -as well as others which were not considered but could also have an important impact, such as vulnerability to flooding and natural disasters, crime, and availability of infrastructure and health and education services.
Poverty by Locality, Gender, and Sector
The poverty decline has been broad-based across urban and rural areas. As shown in Table 1 , poverty declined substantially in all three main localities: the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA), other cities, and rural areas. Although urban areas excluding KMA registered the greatest percentage decline in poverty, these areas account for less than a quarter of all the poor in Jamaica. Thus, the primary driving force behind the decline in aggregate poverty has been the reduction in the poverty headcount in the rural areas of Jamaica, which had a high initial concentration of the poor ( Figure A1 ). This is consistent with the evidence on higher-order measures of poverty presented in the previous paragraph, since the rural poor tend to be worse off than the urban poor (even after taking into account the lower poverty line in rural areas). The relatively larger improvement in the consumption of initially poorer parts of the population also explains some of the reduction in inequality discussed earlier in this section and is consistent with the GIC in Figure 3 . holds in Jamaica. However, as long as there is no consistent bias in the sampling methodology towards/against some of the parishes, it is still possible to evaluate within-parish trends over time. With this caveat, it is clear that poverty declined substantially in the three parishes comprising the Kingston Metropolitan Area: Kingston, St. Andrew, and St. Catherine. Similarly, poverty in parishes with large numbers of rural dwellers -such as Portland, St. Mary, and St. Elizabeth -has fallen rapidly, consistent with the evidence in the previous paragraph.
In order to provide a visual representation of the evolution and concentration of poverty by parish, Figure A2 and Figure A3 plot the parish-level poverty headcount and the share of the total number of the poor, respectively, on a map of Jamaica. The evolution of poverty in Figure A2 suggests that poverty reduction in the north-east of Jamaica (and in St. Elizabeth) has been more rapid than in other parts of the island. On the other hand, Clarendon continues to be one of the poorest parishes in Jamaica; ignoring the 2007 jump in poverty in Westmoreland, Clarendon was the parish with the highest incidence of poverty in 2006-07. The geographic concentration of poverty in Jamaica, documented in Figure A3 , appears to have increased over time, with a growing density of the poor in Clarendon and, to a lesser extent, Manchester.
Moving on to differences by gender, the poverty headcount is higher for households with a female head because these households are larger and have more children. In 2003, the poverty headcount among femaleheaded households was nearly four percentage points higher than the headcount for male-headed households. 25 As both types of households experienced nearly identical rates of poverty reduction between 2003 and 2007, the gap between the two groups remained the same in relative terms. In order to understand the relationship between household size, gender of the head, and poverty, Table A1 summarizes the relevant characteristics of households headed by males and females in 2003 and 2007. The first ten rows of the table show that, even though female-headed households are over-represented among poor households in Jamaica, the difference in the household's likelihood to be poor does not significantly vary by gender. In other words, without controlling for any other determinant of household consumption, there is no bias in poverty with regard to the gender of the household head: households headed by males or females are equally likely to be poor. Instead, what accounts for the higher headcount among female-headed households is their larger size. The last six rows of Table  A1 show that female-headed households are on average larger than maleheaded households; the difference is due to these households having more children. This difference is even larger for poor female-headed households, who on average have nearly two more children than a poor household headed by a male.
26
Poverty among households with the primary earner working in agriculture fell substantially, but at a slower rate than for households with primary earners in other sectors. The headcount among households with the primary earner in agriculture declined from 37.3 percent in 2003 to 22.6 in 2007 (with a brief spike in 2006). However, poverty among households with primary earners in service sectors fell at a rate that was one-third faster. The slower rate of poverty reduction among agricultural households is correlated with two (inter-related) developments. First, although most of the aggregate reduction in poverty between 2003 and 2007 occurred in rural areas -where most agricultural households reside -the rate at which poverty fell was faster in urban areas and KMA.
27 Second, the size of the agricultural sector -measured by the share of households with the primary earner in agriculture -has been steadily declining from 23 percent in 2003 to 19 percent in 2007. 28 Normally, it is the richer households -those with greater physical and human capital assets -who are more likely to exit the agricultural sector and the households who do not shift into non-agricultural occupations tend be worse off on average. Consequently, the consumption of agricultural households increased at a slower rate than households with primary earners in other sectors. 26 Poor households in general tend to be larger than non-poor households, with fewer working-age members and more children and elderly. 27 This is due to the fact that most initial poor are rural poor (and, by extension, households deriving most of their income from agriculture). 28 In 2007, the share of agricultural households increased from the previous year, when it was estimated at 16 percent. 
